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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A recent literature has documented empirically how distortions that raise the cost of labor or capital aﬀect
aggregate productivity though misallocations of resources from more productive to less productive ﬁrms. As
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) argued1 more eﬃcient ﬁrms may have “too little” output or employment
allocated to them due to various distortions in their economies. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) have argued that
these misallocations go a long way towards explaining the gap in aggregate productivity between the US,
China and India. In this paper, we focus on understanding the impact and the size of one speciﬁc distortion
on the French ﬁrm size distribution: regulations sharply increasing labor costs when ﬁrms reach 50 workers.
The idea that misallocations of resources may be partly behind the productivity gap is attractive in
understanding the diﬀerences between the US and Europe. As Figure 1 shows, there appear to be far fewer
French ﬁrms which are able to grow to the same scale as the productive US ﬁrms. Figure 1 shows two
interesting patterns.2 F i r s t ,t h e r ei sal a r g eb u l g ei nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms with employment just below 50
workers in France, but no such bulge in the distribution of American ﬁrms. Second, there is a much larger
share of very large ﬁrms in the US - the US has many more ﬁrms with over 2,500 employees than does France.
This paper focuses on the ﬁrst of those patterns, although we plan to examine the absence of very large
French ﬁrms in later work.
Labor legislation in France substantially increases ﬁring costs when ﬁrms employ 50 or more workers.
Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms with 50 or more employees must formulate a “social plan,” which is designed to facilitate
reemployment, through training, etc. As a result, the costs of employing workers also rise (see Bertola and
Bentolila, 1990) at that threshold. Figure 2 shows that indeed the legislation binds, so that there is a clear
threshold eﬀect at precisely 50 ﬁrms. This uses 2007 data, but the discontinuity in the size distribution at 50
workers is present in all years of our data (see below).
What are the distortions in the size distribution, in the productivity distribution, and on aggregate pro-
ductivity that result from those distortions? Our approach relies on revealed preference and on positive
sorting eﬀects. Some ﬁrms that would have been larger without the regulation choose to remain below the
legal threshold to avoid these additional costs. In this paper we aim to identify these ﬁrms, calculate their
counterfactual size, and use this observation to infer the cost of this legislation.
1See also Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) and Petrin and Sivadasan (2010). A closely related literature is in development
economics where some have pointed to the “missing middle”, i.e. a preponderance of very small ﬁrms in poorer countries
compared to richer countries (see Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2005, or Jones, 2011). Many explanations have been put forward for this
such as ﬁnancial development, human capital, lack of competition in product markets, and social capital. One possibility, related
to our approach, is size related labor regulations. Besley and Burgess (2004), for example, suggest that labor regulation is one
of the reasons why the formal manufacturing sector is much smaller in some Indian states compared to others.
2Bartelsman et al (2009) examine misallocation using micro-data across many OECD countries and make a similar point. In
particular, they ﬁnd that the “Olley Pakes” (1996) covariance between size and productivity is much smaller in France (0.24 in
their Table 1) and other European countries compared to the US (0.51 in their Table 1).
2There has been extensive discussion of the importance of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for
unemployment and more recently productivity (e.g. Layard and Nickell, 1999; OECD, 2009). The OECD,
World Bank and other agencies have developed various indices of the importance of these regulations based
on examination of laws and (sometimes) surveys of managers. It is very hard, however, to see how these
can be quantiﬁed as “adding up” the legal and regulatory provisions has a large arbitrary component. A
contribution of our paper is to oﬀer a methodology for quantifying the “tax equivalent” of a regulation, albeit
in the context of a speciﬁcm o d e l .
There are diﬀerent views on the underlying sources of heterogeneity in ﬁrm productivity. We follow Lucas
(1978) in taking the stand that managerial talent is the primitive, and that the economy-wide observed
resource distribution is, as Manne (1965) felicitously put it, “a solution to the problem: allocate productive
factors over managers of diﬀerent ability so as to maximize output.” Managers make discrete decisions or
solve problems (Garicano, 2000). Making better decisions, or solving problems that others cannot solve,
raises everyone’s marginal product. This means that, in equilibrium, better managers must be allocated more
resources. In fact, absent decreasing returns to managerial talent, the best manager must be allocated all
resources. Given limits to managerial time or attention, the better managers are allocated more workers
and more capital to manage. This results in a “scale-of-operations” eﬀect whereby diﬀerences in talent are
ampliﬁed by the resources allocated.3 Lucas (1978) ﬁrst explored these eﬀects in an equilibrium setting.4
Consequently better managers, that is those that for whatever reason are able to generate more produc-
tivity, should be allocated (or equivalently, should choose) larger ﬁrm sizes. When managers are confronted
with legislation that introduces a cost of acquiring a size that is beyond a certain threshold, they may choose
to stay below the threshold and stay at an ineﬃciently small size. By studying the productivity of these
marginal managers, we are able to estimate the cost of the legislation, the distortions in them, and thus the
welfare cost of the legislation for the entire ﬁrm size distribution.5
We start by setting up a simple model of the allocation of a single factor, labor to ﬁrms in a world where
there are decreasing returns to managerial talent. We use it to study the eﬀect of a step change in labor costs
after a particular size and show that there are four main eﬀects:
3In a model of this kind, the source of decreasing returns are on the production size, and are linked to limits to managerial
time. For our purposes here, as Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show, this source of decreasing returns is equivalent to having the
decreasing returns come (as is more common in recent literature following Melitz, 2003) from the utility side.
4Such a scale of operations eﬀects is at the heart of Rosen’s (1982) theory of hierarchies, where eﬃciency units of labor
controlled (and not just number of bodies) matter, and also in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) where there is limited
quantity-quality substitutability so that matching between workers and managers takes place. Empirically, this technology has
been used to explain a wide-range of phenomena, most recently to calibrate the impact of scale of operations eﬀects on CEO
wages (Gabaix and Landier, 2008).
5Many empirical papers have shown that deregulation (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996), higher competition (e.g. Syverson, 2004)
and trade liberalization (e.g. Pavcnik, 2002) have tended to improve reallocation by increasing the correlation between ﬁrm size
and productivity.
31. Equilibrium wages fall as a result of the reduction in the demand for workers (i.e. some of the tax
incidence falls on workers)
2. Firm size increases for all ﬁrms below the threshold as a result of the general equilibrium eﬀect on wages
3. Firm size reduces to precisely the regulatory threshold for a set of ﬁrms that are not productive enough
to justify incurring the regulatory costs
4. Firm size reduces proportionally for all ﬁrms that are productive enough to incur the additional cost of
regulation.
We use the model to guide our estimation of the impact of these costs. The theory tells us there is a
deviation from the ‘correct’ ﬁrm size distribution as a result of the regulation. That is, we expect to see a
departure from the usual power law ﬁrm size distribution6 as ﬁrms bunch up below the threshold (50 workers).
Given factors such as measurement error, the observed empirical departure from the power law is not just
at 49 workers but at a slightly smaller ﬁrm size. Similarly, there is not precisely zero mass to the left of the
cut-oﬀ (at 50), but rather a “valley” were there are signiﬁcantly fewer ﬁrms than we would expect from an
unbroken power law. Then, at some point the distribution becomes again a power law, with a lower intercept.
The jump in the power law identiﬁes the size of the distortion.
Our results are consistent across speciﬁcations, and show that the cost of these regulations is approximately
equivalent to a 5-10% increase in wages. There are thus large misallocations of resources that follow from
the implicit tax. Of course, it does not follow that the welfare loss is of this magnitude: society may value
the increase in job security of workers working in medium and large size ﬁr m sa ss u ﬃciently important to
compensate such large welfare losses. Determining this, however, requires knowing the cost in terms of lost
output, which is what our approach delivers.
The most closely related paper to ours is Braguinsky, Branstetter and Regateiro (2011) who seek to explain
the shift to the left in the Portuguese ﬁrm size distribution in the context of the Lucas model with labour
regulations. Their calibrations also show substantial eﬀects of the regulations on lower aggregate productivity.
Ad i ﬀerence between our paper and theirs is that we exploit the sharp discontinuity at employment size 50
evident in the law and our data to identify the structural parameters of our model and the implicit cost of
regulation, whereas there does not appear to be such a sharp break in their data on Portuguese ﬁrms7.
6See Axtell (2001), Sutton (1997) and Gabaix, (2009). There is a large literature on the size and productivity distribution of
ﬁrms in macro, trade, ﬁnance and IO. Appropriately, the ﬁrst major study in this area was by Gibrat (1931) who studied French
industrial ﬁrms, the main focus of the empirical part of our paper.
7Braguinsky et al (2011) attribute this to the sheer multitude of size-related regulations in Portugal that makes it hard to
identify any sharp cut-oﬀ in the size distribution.
4The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our theory and some extensions. Section 3
describes the institutional setting and data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy of how we map the
theory into the data. Section 5 contains the main results which come in two parts. First we show that the
main empirical predictions of the model in terms of the size and productivity distribution are consistent with
the data. Secondly, we estimate the parameters of the structural model and use this to show that the costs of
the regulation are non-trivial. We present various extensions and robustness tests in Section 6 before drawing
some conclusions in the ﬁnal section.
2T h e o r y
We aim to estimate the distortions in the productivity distribution and the reallocation eﬀe c tt h a tr e s u l t
from an implicit tax on ﬁrm size that starts at a particular threshold. Our strategy relies on analyzing the
choices of those ﬁrms that prefer to stay at a lower size in order to avoid the tax. Having done that, we will
be able to estimate the general equilibrium eﬀects of the tax through the changes in ﬁrm size.
We study regulatory eﬀects on the ﬁrm size distribution and on the productivity distribution in the
simplest possible version of Lucas’ model. There is only one input in production, labor, and a single sector.
The primitive of the model is the distribution () of ‘managerial ability’  (which we will measure as Total
Factor Productivity, ) with cdf Φ : + → [01] Ability is deﬁned and measured by how much an agent
can raise a team’s output: a manager who has ability  and is allocated  workers produces  = () Larger
teams produce more, 0  0 but given e.g. limited managerial time, there are decreasing returns to the ﬁrm
scale that a manager can manage, 00  0.
The key diﬀerence between our setting and the original Lucas model is that, in our application, there is
a tax on ﬁrm size, which imposes a wedge between the wage the worker receives and the cost to the ﬁrm.8
Since termination costs are generally denominated in years of salary, we assume this cost is a proportional
increase in wage costs, taking the form of a labor tax. Moreover, this tax does not grow in a smooth way,
but instead it begins hitting ﬁrms after they reach a given size 
2.1 Individual Optimization
Let () be the proﬁts obtained by a manager with skill  when he manages a ﬁrm at the optimal size. These
proﬁts are then given by:
8In our application the ‘tax’ involves an extra marginal cost and also a ﬁxed cost component. However, previous studies of
this problem, such as particularly Kramarz and Michaud (2003) show that the ﬁxed cost component are second order relative
to the marginal cost component.
5()=m a x
 () − 
(
 =1 if 
 =  if  ≥ 
(1)
where  is the worker’s wage,  is the number of workers and  is the tax, which only applies for ﬁrm over a
minimum threshold of  (50) workers in our application).
Firm size at each side of the threshold is then determined by ﬁrst order condition:
0(∗) − =0  with  =  if  ≥  (2)
so that ∗ = 0−1(
 ) Note that   0,   0 and   0






Firms can legally avoid being hit by the regulation by choosing to remain small. The cost of this avoidance
is increasing in the talent () of the individual, and thus at a given ability level, given a choice between staying
at  =  and avoiding the tax, managers choose to pay the tax. The ability of the “marginal manager” that
is unconstrained ()i sd e ﬁned by the indiﬀerence condition between remaining small and jumping to be a
larger ﬁrm and paying the regulatory tax as:
() −  = (∗()) − ∗() (4)
where ∗() is the optimal ﬁrm size for an agent of skill  We call this threshold  where  denotes the
boundary of the unconstrained ﬁrms, and the ﬁrm size ∗() is denoted 
2.2 Equilibrium
The most skilled individuals choose to be manager-entrepreneurs, since they beneﬁt from their higher ability
in two ways. First, for a given ﬁrm size  they earn more. Second, the most skilled individuals hire a larger
team, (). We denote the ability threshold between managers and workers as min
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Given a distribution of managerial talent () a per worker labor tax  that binds all ﬁrms of
size  ≥ , and a production function () a competitive equilibrium consists of:
() a wage level  paid to all workers
6() an allocation () that assigns a ﬁrm of size  to a particular manager of skill 
() a triple of cutoﬀs{min ≤  ≤ } such that  =[ 0  min] is the set of workers, 1 =[ min ] is
the set of unconstrained, untaxed managers, 2 =[  ] is the set of constrained, ∗ = , but untaxed
managers, and 2 =[ ∞] is the set of taxed managers such that:
(1) No agent wishes to change occupation from manager to worker or to change from unconstrained to con-
strained.
(2) The choice of () for each manager  is optimal given their skills, taxes  and wages ;
(3) Supply of labor equals demand for labor
Start with condition (1): an agent prefers to be a worker if  ()− or a manager if  ()−
and thus we have:
min() −  =  (5)
Equilibrium condition (2), from the ﬁrst order condition (2) implies that ﬁrm sizes are given by:




) if min   (7)




) if  ∞ (9)
Thus we have four categories of agents as the following ﬁgure shows:


















Finally, from condition (3), equilibrium requires that markets clear- that is the supply and demand of
workers must be equalized. The supply of workers is Φ(min), and the demand of workers by all available
managers,
R ∞






7Solving the model involves ﬁnding four parameters, the cutoﬀ levels min  , and the equilibrium wage
 For this we use the four equations (3), (4), (5) and (10).
The equilibrium is unique; the following proposition characterizes the comparative statics in the equilib-
rium:
Proposition 1 The introduction of a tax/variable cost of hiring workers starting at ﬁrm size  has the
following eﬀects:
1. Reduces equilibrium wages as a result of the reduction in the demand for workers
2. Increases ﬁrm size for all ﬁrms below the threshold, [min ] as a result of the general equilibrium
eﬀect that reduces wages
3. Reduces ﬁrm size to the threshold  for all ﬁrms that are constrained, that is those in [ ]
4. Reduces ﬁrm size for all ﬁrms that are taxed [∞]
Example. Consider a power law, ()= 06
16 and returns to scale parameter of  =0 9.F i g u r e 4
shows the ﬁrm size distribution for a ﬁrm size cut-oﬀ at 50 employees, and an employment tax of 1%.A s
in the distribution in the data, there is a spike at 49 employees that breaks the power law. Figure 5 reports
the productivity distribution  as a function of ﬁrm size . It shows that we should expect a spike in the
productivity distribution at the point in which the regulation starts to bind. Essentially the maximum bar
of this graph is the most productive ﬁrm that is aﬀected by the regulation. We can trace the ﬁrm size simply
by moving horizontally to the right in the graph.
2.3 Empirical Implications
The econometric work that follows aims to use the theory as a guide to estimate the welfare losses that result
from this regulation. As is well known, the ﬁrm size distribution generally follows a power law (see e.g. Axtell,
2001). Lucas (1978) shows that Gibrat’s law implies that the returns to scale function must be ()=,
and that for it to be consistent with a power law, the managerial ability or productivity distribution must
also be power, ()=− with the constants   0 and   0. This is not a bad approximation: the
distribution of TFP is somewhere between log normal and power, but the ﬁt for a power distribution is good
for a large fraction of the data.







8A ﬁrm below the tax threshold  chooses a ﬁrm size ∗ = 0−1(
); while a ﬁrm above the threshold
chooses ∗
 = 0−1(
 ) In the empirical section we rely on this relationship between  and ﬁrm size  to
estimate the counterfactual welfare if the labor regulation  were to be removed:
∗()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




= 11(1−) = 1() if  










 1() if  ≤ 
(12)
In [1 ] we ﬁnd ﬁrms that are not directly aﬀected by the distortion. The only impact of the regulation
comes through the general equilibrium impact because of lower wages  This induces some low-ability
individuals to became small ﬁrms rather than remain as workers (i.e. the regulatory distortion creates too
many entrepreneurial small ﬁrms). At [ ] we ﬁnd the constrained ﬁrms: ﬁrms that, given the choice
between paying the labor cost ∗ and choosing their optimal size and paying ∗ but staying at size 50,
prefer to stay below 50. Once productivity exceeds a higher threshold  ﬁrms are suﬃciently productive
that they pay the tax in order to produce at a higher level.
If the distribution of () follows a power law, ()=− the distribution of ﬁrm sizes () is also
power (apart from the threshold), since by the change of variable formula, ()=(()) ∗ −
(1−)

(omitting the threshold). The power law on ∗ is then given by:
∗()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − )
−1
1 − if − 1=1()
R 
 ()d =  if  =  − 1=1()
0 if  − 1   = 2()
(1 − )
−1
2 − if 2()= ≤ 
(13)
Where  = (1−)+ and  is the mass of ﬁrms whose size is distorted- these are ﬁrms that choose to
stay below the ﬁrm size threshold, rather than getting to a large size and paying the additional labor cost, .
The adding up constraints on  can be written more conveniently in the size () space rather than the




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
( − 1)− if 49 = 1()
491− − 1−
 if  =4 9=1()
0 if 49   = 2()
( − 1)− if 2()= ≤ 
(14)
where  = 
−
−1
1−  The upper employment threshold,  is unknown and must be estimated, and so are 
9the power law term, and Note that the scale parameter in the power law  is unaﬀected by the law; instead,
in the log-log space, the labor regulations generate a parallel shift in the ﬁrm size distribution measured by
 Thus the key empirical implication is that the tax can be recovered from the jump  in the power law.
Our empirical strategy will thus proceed in three steps:
1. We estimate  and the TFP distribution from standard methods of estimating productivity (e.g. from
Olley-Pakes, 1996, style production functions). See Appendix C for details.
2. We estimate the broken power law ∗() and from it, the size of the tax  from the break in the power
law
3. We obtain the counterfactual productivity and thus the production-related welfare loss (there is also
potentially a welfare gain to workers we ignore in the current version) relying on the size productivity
relationship above ∗()
In Section 4, we propose an empirical model in which we introduce an error term in the model so that
we can take it to the data. Such empirical model must account for two departures in Figure 2 from the
predictions in the theory
1. The departure from the power law does not start at , but slightly earlier: there is a bump in the
distribution starting at around 46 workers.
2. The region immediately to the right of  does not have zero density, but rather there are some ﬁrms
with positive employment levels just to the right of the regulatory cut-oﬀ, 
The model we propose to account for these departures features a measurement error. The justiﬁcation for
such mis-measurement is straightforward: the measurement of ﬁrm size that we have is not exactly the same
one as the one used to determine whether a ﬁrm is subject to the regulation or not. From the perspective of
the regulation, the relevant concept of employment is the number of workers at the precise date where the
collective dismissal is announced. Our measure of ﬁrm size is the mandatory item that is reported in the
ﬁrm’s ﬁscal accounts - the arithmetic mean of the workforce at the end of the quarter of the ﬁscal year.9
3 Empirical Strategy
How costly is the employment protection legislation? We uncover this cost through revealed preference.
Essentially, our approach is to identify the “constrained ﬁrms”, those which legally avoid the regulation by
9Fiscal deﬁnition, article 208-III-3 du Code General des Impots.
10remaining too small, and identifying them. Once we have done this, we can calculate what they would have
produced in the counterfactual world and thus we have an estimate of the cost of the regulation. In this
section we explain how we apply our theoretical framework to the data we just reviewed.
3.1 Empirical Model
Recall that our starting point is the pdf of ∗, which is, according to the theory in equation (14):
∗()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
( − 1)− if 49 = 1()
491− − 1−
 if  =4 9=1()
0 if 49   = 2()
( − 1)− if 2()= ≤ 
where  = 
−
−1
1− is unknown and must be estimated, and so are ,t h ep o w e rl a wt e r m ,a n d.
Employment is measured with error so we assume that rather than observing ∗() we observe:
()=∗()
Where the measurement error  is unobservable. In the data we observe the distribution of and thus
obtaining the likelihood function requires that we obtain the density function of  The law of |, has support
on [;+∞]. The conditional cumulative distribution function is given by:
P( |)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if ln() 
1 − (−)
1− if ln() − ln(49) ≤ ln()
1 − 1−
 if ln() − ln() ≤ ln() − ln(49)
1 − (−)
1− if  ≤ ln() − ln()












In Appendix A we show that no further constraints on the parameters are required for this object to be a
CDF:
Lemma 1 Let  be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance  so that the measurement error is log
normal. Then the function P( ) is a cumulative distribution function, that is strictly increasing in ,
with lim−→0 P =0a n dlim−→∞ P =1 for all feasible values of all parameters, , 
Thus taking the derivative of P formulated in this way we can obtain the density of the observed 
Given such a density, it is straightforward to estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood.
11Speciﬁcally, the maximum likelihood estimation yields estimates of the parameters: b , b b b 10
Figure 6 shows the diﬀerence between the pure model where employment was measured without error and
the true model where there is measurement error. The solid (blue) line shows the ﬁrm size distribution under
the pure model of Section 2 (same as Figure 4) whereas the hatched line shows the ﬁrm size distribution
when we allow for measurement error. The smoothness of the hump around 50 will depend on the degree of
measurement error - Figure 6 shows that if we increase the measurement error to  =0 5 instead of  =0 15
it is almost impossible to visually identify the eﬀects of the regulation.
Given these results and the deﬁnition of  = 
−
−1
1− , we need an estimate for the returns to scale parameter
 We can obtain this from the size-productivity relation or, alternatively, from our TFP estimation. Then
we have an estimate of the implicit tax of regulation as:




We obtain standard errors for the estimate of the tax using the delta method. To be precise, let b Θ =( b  b b )0
be the vector of asymptotically Gaussian estimates obtained in the previous steps. The asymptotic variance-
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3.2 Welfare calculations (tbc)
From the TFP estimation we obtain estimates for the 0 and from the estimation of the broken power law
we have estimates of the parameters  and the cut-oﬀ  We can then obtain a counterfactual ﬁrm size
distribution in the world without tax and the total production loss in this economy due to the tax distortion.
4 Institutional Setting and Data
10In a previous version of the paper we generated OLS estimators of these parameters. However, Bauke (2007) and Howell
(2002), both within the physics literature, have shown that least square methods may be unreliable. Gabaix and Ibragimov
(2011) make the same point and propose a simple rank-based method with the robust approximations for for standard errors.
Calculation of these is non-trivial, however. In Appendix B we show how to obtain OLS estimates of the parameters of interest
developing a new methodology borrowed from the time series literature on structural breaks. These results suggest a larger
implict tax of the regulation.
124.1 Institutions: The French Labor market and Employment Costs
France is renowned for having a highly regulated labor market (see Abowd and Kramarz, 2003; Kramarz
and Michaud, 2010). What is less well known is that most of these laws only bind on a ﬁrm when it reaches
a particular employment size threshold. By far the most important size threshold is when a ﬁrm hits ﬁfty
employees - at this point of number of labour market regulations bind regarding the ﬁrm’s ability to adjust
its labor. Although there are some regulations that bind when a ﬁrm (or less often, a plant) reaches a lower
threshold such as 10, 20 or 25 employees, 50 is generally agreed by labour lawyers and business people to be
the critical threshold when costs rise signiﬁcantly (see Appendix C)11.
Perhaps the most important of these is a set of regulations introduced under a major piece of legislation
in 1989. This required ﬁrms with 50 or more employees to formulate a “social plan” before laying oﬀ 10
or more workers (a “collective termination”). This social plan must place a limit on the total number of
terminations, lay out plans to facilitate reemployment of terminated workers and will typically insist on an
extensive retraining program. Union representatives or personnel delegates and the departmental director of
the Ministry of Labor must also be informed of the plan. Two public meetings of the works council (“comité
d’entreprise”) must be organized with an interval between the meetings of 2—4 weeks depending upon the
number of terminations proposed. The works council may require the ﬁrm to hire a consulting accountant (at
the company’s expense) to help the council with its analysis. During this period, the Ministry of Labor must
be continuously informed of the proceedings, the plan, and the names of the proposed terminated workers.
In addition to these ﬁring costs in the 1989 law, there are some other pieces of regulation that bite at size 50
(see Appendix C).
How important are such provisions for ﬁrms? It is hard to know directly, as the opportunity cost of
managerial time involved in preparing for such eventualities may be very great. Our framework is designed
to recover the costs of such regulations. We treat such ﬁring costs as an increase in the cost of labour. Firms
face future shocks which will require them to adjust labor. Firms facing such a ﬁring cost will eﬀectively face
a much higher cost in the eventuality that they face a negative shock. This aﬀects the decision to hire and is
(in expected value terms) very much like a labor tax. Since our analysis is fundamentally cross sectional we
will model the ﬁring cost as a labour tax.
There are other laws aﬀecting French ﬁrms, so in one sense we are estimating a lower bound to the cost of
regulation. But we are alert to the problem that some of the data is also aﬀected by other laws which may
also have a size-related threshold. Discussions with the labor ministry, lawyers, unions and business people
11http://www.travail-emploi-sante.gouv.fr/informations-pratiques,89/ﬁches-pratiques,91/licenciement,121/le-plan-de-
sauvegarde-de-l-emploi,1107.html
13conﬁrm that the threshold of 50 is the most important one in France, so it makes sense to begin our analysis
here.
4.2 Data
Our main dataset is administrative data covering the universe of French ﬁrms between 2002 and 2007. These
hold about 2.2m observations per year, but we restrict our estimation sample to the ca 200,000 of them
are active in manufacturing industries (NACE2 class 15 to 35; 227 four-digit industries). These are the
(mandatory) ﬁscal returns of all French ﬁrms (“FICUS”) and are the appropriate level for analysis as it is
on this administrative unit (“entreprise”) that the main laws pertain to. In addition to accurate information
on employment (average number of workers in last quarter of the ﬁscal year), FICUS contains balance sheet
information on labor, capital, investment, wage bills, materials, four digit industry aﬃliation, zipcode, etc.
that are important in estimating productivity. More details of the dataset are given in the Appendix.
We take several approaches to estimating productivity. Our baseline results use the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) version of the Olley and Pakes (1996) method of using a control function approach to deal with
unobserved productivity shocks and selection when estimating production functions. Because we have a
panel of ﬁrms we can implement this and estimate the production function coeﬃcients. The details of these
regressions are reported in Appendix C. There are several issues with this approach (see Ackerberg et al,
2007) to estimating production functions so we also estimate TFP using a variety of other methods (see
Appendix C for details).
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Qualitative analysis of the data
Before moving to the econometrics we ﬁrst examine some qualitative features of the data to see whether
they are consistent with our model. Many commentators have expressed skepticism about the quantitative
importance of employment regulations as it is sometimes hard to observe any clear change in the size distri-
bution around important legal thresholds12,s ow eﬁrst focus on this issue. Figure 7 presents the empirical
distribution of ﬁrm size around the cut-oﬀ of 50 employees for two datasets. The dataset we use (FICUS),
the ﬁscal ﬁles of the French tax administration, is the population dataset of the universe of French ﬁrms that
forms the basis of our econometric work. Panel 7.1 in Figure 7 is the same as Figure 2 except now on 2002
12For example, Schivardi and Torrini (2008) and Boeri and Jimeno (2005) on Italian data, Braguinsky et al (2011) on Portuguese
data or Abidoye et al (2010) on Sri Lankan data. The authors ﬁnd that there is slower growth just under the threshold consistent
with the regulation slowing growth, but they ﬁnd relatively little eﬀect on the cross-sectional distribution. This may be because
of the multitude of regulations, variable enforcement or measurement error in the employment data (see sub-section 2.3).
14data instead of 2007 data. The qualitative features are clearly stable across years: just as in Figure 2 there
is a sharp discontinuity in size precisely at 50 employees which is strong non-parametric evidence for the
importance of the regulation. There are just over 400 ﬁrms with exactly 49 employees and then only about
130 with 50 employees. Importantly, the distribution which declines from 31 employees ﬂattens after about
44 employees, just before the stacking up at 49 employees then dropping oﬀ as h a r pc l i ﬀ when size hits 50.
The top right hand side of Figure 7 shows this in log-log space clearly indicating the evidence of a “broken
power law”.
The next panel of Figure 7 compares FICUS with another dataset, DADS (Déclaration Annuelle de Don-
nées Sociales), that is also frequently typically used by labor economists. DADS is a worker-level dataset
containing information on occupation (see Figure 7.2), wages and demographics. In Panel 7.2 we aggregate
employment up to the appropriate level for each FICUS ﬁrm. This enables us to investigate diﬀerent measures
of employment such as employment dated on 31st December. The discrete jump at 50 shows up here almost
a sc l e a r l ya st h eF I C U Sd a t a .T h eb o t t o mp a n e l so fF i g u r eu s e sF u l l - T i m eE q u i v a l e n t sw h i c hs h o w sl e s so fa
jump than the straight count of employees in the previous panels (the main labor laws relate to the number
of workers rather than full-Time Equivalents, so this is expected). Figure 7 illustrates the importance of
good data - one of the reasons that other studies have not identiﬁed such a clear discontinuity around the
regulatory threshold is that they may have been using data with even greater measurement error than our
own and not using the full population (as we do).
Figure 8 shows the ﬁrm size distribution over a larger range between 1 and 1,000 employees. Overall, ﬁrm
size seems to approximate a power law in the employment size distribution prior to the bulge around 50.
After 50, there is a sharp fall in the number of ﬁrms and the line more ﬂat than expected before resuming
what looks like another power law. Broadly, outside a “distorted” region around 50 employees, one could
describe this pattern a “broken power law” with the break at 5013.T h eﬁnding of the power-law for ﬁrm size
in France is similar to that for many other countries and has been noted by other authors (e.g. Giovanni et
al, 2010; Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010), but the ﬁnding of the break in the law precisely around the main
labor market regulation has not (yet) been documented in the academic literature, except in Ceci-Renaud and
Chevalier (2011). As is well known the power law ﬁts rather less well for the very small ﬁrms. Additionally,
t h e r ed o e sa p p e a rt ob es o m eb r e a ki nt h ep o w e rl a wa tﬁrm size 10 and possibly as smaller one at ﬁrm size 20.
This corresponds to the size thresholds from other pieces of labor and accounting regulations (see Appendix
D ) .I no r d e rt oa v o i dc o n ﬂating these issues we focus our analysis on ﬁrms with 20 or more employees in the
rest of the paper. We can generalize the methods used here to other breaks in the Power Law which we will
13See Howell (2002) for examples of how to estimate these types of distributions. More generally see Bauke (2007) for ways of
consistently estimating power laws.
15exploit in future versions.
The distribution of TFP is presented in Figure 9. This shows that the mean level of TFP is higher in each
size class of ﬁrm which is what we would expect from the model. Our basic model, following Lucas, has the
implication that more talented managers leverage their ability over a greater number of workers.
We cut the same data in a slightly diﬀerent way in Figure 10 plotting the mean TFP levels by ﬁrm size.
Panel A does this for ﬁrms between 5 and 100 employees whereas Panel B extends the threshold out to ﬁrms
with up to 1000 employees. In all panels productivity appears to rise monotonically with size, although there
is more heteroskedacity for the larger ﬁrms as we would expect because there are fewer ﬁr m si ne a c hb i n .T h e
relationship between TFP and size is broadly log-linear. What is particularly interesting for our purposes,
however, is the “bulge” in productivity just before the 50 employee threshold. We mark these points in red.
This looks consistent with our model where some of the more productive ﬁrms who would have been just over
50 employees in the counterfactual world, choose to be below 50 employees to avoid the cost of the regulation.
Firms just below the cut-oﬀ a r eam i x t u r eo fﬁrms who would have had a similar employment level without
the implicit tax and those ﬁrms whose size is distorted by the size-related regulation.
We exploit the relationship between size and TFP to identify the , returns to scale parameter in the
empirical estimates.
5.2 Econometric Implementation of the model
5.2.1 ML Estimation of Key parameters
The key parameters are estimated from the size distribution of ﬁrms using the ML procedure described above.
Column (1) of Table 1 presents the baseline results using the population of manufacturing ﬁrms 2002-2007.
Given the large sample sizes of almost 0.7m observations the estimates are very precise. We obtain an estimate
of the slope of the power law of about 1.7 which is mainly identiﬁed from the slope of the line (say in Figure 8)
before and after the cut-oﬀ. The upper employment threshold is estimated to be about an employment level
of 61. We obtain a standard deviation of the measurement error of just over 0.2, which suggests signiﬁcant,
but not major amounts of mismeasured employment. Figure 11 shows the data and the ﬁto ft h em o d e l
using the estimated parameters. Although not perfect, we seem to do a reasonable job at mimicking the size
distribution around the threshold when allowing for measurement error.
T h ee s t i m a t eo f which is determined in part by the implicit tax is 0.799 in Table 1. To calculate the
crucial cost of regulation we have to also obtain an estimate of , the returns to scale parameter. We examine
various values of this in Table 2. The ﬁrst row simply calibrates the value of  to be 0.8 which is associated
with a a value of  of 1.066 with a standard error of 0.003. This implies that the implicit cost of the tax is
16around 7%. The second row is our preferred method of estimating  which exploits the optimization conditions
and the TFP-size relationship (essentially the degree to which more able managers are allocated to larger
ﬁrms). Basically, we are using the slope of the relationship in Figure 10 between size and TFP (except the
red points which indicate the distorted areas). From this we obtain an estimate of  of 1.065, indicating an
implicit tax rate of 6.5%. The third row uses the parameters directly estimated from the production function
(see Appendix Table 1). This implies a tax rate of 4.1%.
All in all the estimates of the implied rates of tax are around 4-7%, a signiﬁcant but not huge burden.
We have also some preliminary investigations into heterogeneity of the eﬀects across diﬀerent sectors.
Although we plan to allow for much more heterogeneity in future work, we begin with simply splitting the
industries into high tech and low tech following OECD deﬁnitions (these are based on R&D intensity). The
estimates of parameters of the size distribution are given in the second and third columns of Table 1 and the
implicit tax in the last rows of Table 2. There does appear to be signiﬁcant heterogeneity with the estimated
implicit tax bearing more heavily in low-tech sectors (5.6%) than high tech sectors (1.3%). We plan to pursue
this in future work.
6 Extensions and Robustness
In this section we consider several extensions to our framework and robustness tests of the results.
6.1 Estimates of GDP and welfare loss
We have not yet completed a full welfare evaluation, but an indication of the importance of the regulation
can be gauged from a back of the envelope calculation based on how many ﬁrms around the threshold are
distorted. We estimate that  =0 05 indicating that about 0.05% of French ﬁrms are distorted. This is a
small number but we estimate that these ﬁrms lose about 35% of their output so this contributes to a lowering
of GDP of 0.5%. This is an underestimate of the full regulatory cost because we are not inter alia taking
into account (1) the additional cost of the tax for ﬁrms above the upper threshold ()a n d( 2 )t h ed i s t o r t i o n
arising from the artiﬁcially low wage because of the incidence of the regulation on workers. Future work will
expand these calculations.
6.2 Changing the organizational structure of corporations
An obvious way in which a business group could respond to the regulation is by splitting itself into smaller
subsidiaries. Thus a ﬁrm which wished to grow to 50 employees could split itself into two 25 employee ﬁrms
17controlled by the group CEO. There are costs to such a strategy - the ﬁrm will have to ﬁle separate ﬁscal and
legal accounts, demonstrate that the aﬃliates are operating autonomously and suﬀer from greater problems
of loss of control. The authorities are well aware of such strategies of large ﬁrms pretending to be small in
order to avoid regulation and there are hefty ﬁnes and prison terms for executives seeking to do this.
Nevertheless, one way to check for this issue is to split the sample into those ﬁrms that are stand alone
businesses and those that are part of larger groups. If groups could simply split themselves into smaller
subsidiaries when they crossed the threshold of 50 employees we should expect to see no discontinuity in
group size around the threshold. Figure 12 splits the size distribution into subsidiaries which are standalone
and those which are part of larger groups. For the latter we aggregate employment to the group level. We
can see a clear discontinuity around 50 employees for the group size (as well as the standalone ﬁrms). This
suggests that corporate restructuring does not full undue the regulation14.
6.3 Other margins of adjustment to the regulation
The simplest version of the model focuses on the decision over ﬁrm size based on employment. However,
there are many other possible margins of adjustments that ﬁrms could take to avoid the regulation. This can
be allowed for in the model by re-writing output as  = [()] instead of  = where  are the other
factors of production such as physical and human capital. If there was perfect substitutability between labor
and these other factors then the ﬁrm could avoid the size-distortion we have discussed. More realistically when
there is imperfect substitution the ﬁrm can mitigate some of the costs of the regulation through substitution.
The ﬁrst way that the ﬁrm could adjust is by making its workforce work harder rather than expand the
number of employees. We do ﬁnd some evidence of this in Figure 13 as the number of annual hours increases
just before the threshold of 50 employees. A second way that ﬁrms could mitigate the cost of the regulation
would be to substitute away from labor and into ﬁxed capital. Figure 14 examines capital intensity by ﬁrm
size and does ﬁnd some evidence of this with ﬁrms increasing capital around the threshold.
A third method would be by substituting across workers of diﬀerent occupational types, to use temporary
and outsourced workers who are not covered by the regulation - here we do have some suggestive evidence
suggesting ﬁrms are using this way of adjusting. Figure 15 shows that change in the share of the main three
skill groups in French ﬁrms across ﬁrm size (managers - the most skilled group, manual workers - the least
skilled group and clerical workers - the main middle group). Panel A shows the share of managers (excluding
t h eC E O ) .T h i ss h a r es e e m st or i s ew i t hﬁrm size, but there is a clear change in the pattern around the
14A more extreme reaction of the ﬁrm would be to engage in franchising. This has some further costs as the CEO no longer
has claims over the residual proﬁts of the franchisee and loses much control. In any case, franchising is rare in manufacturing.
18threshold with ﬁrms choosing to increase their proportion of managers just after the regulatory threshold.
Panel B shows almost a mirror image for manual workers - ﬁrms seem to reduce their reliance on less skilled
workers around the threshold. The middle group of workers in Panel C is relatively unaﬀected (the smaller
residual groups look broadly like Panel C). this indicates a pattern whereby instead of expanding the quantity
of workers a as it nears the threshold, ﬁrms will increase the quality of employees by substituting away from
low skilled manuals to more skilled managers. This enables them to increase output without necessarily
increasing employment and paying the extra regulatory cost.
A fourth margin of substitution would be through outsourcing - i.e. using “external workers” which do not
come under the regulation. Figure 16 shows that there is some evidence of this occurring as the proportion
of total expenditure on these outsourced workers rises at the threshold15.
Since we observe all these margins we are able to take account of them in our estimation of the production
function. They should therefore not in principle bias our estimates of TFP. If the ﬁrm was able to perfectly
substitute into these other types of activity the regulation would have little welfare eﬀect as the ﬁrm would
be able adjust around the regulation by smoothly adjusting into other factors.
In summary, ﬁrms do appear to be adjusting to the regulation around the threshold by attempting to
increase hours, capital and skills rather than raw labor when they get close to 50 employees. This is reassuring
as it suggests that ﬁrm size is not just being misreported to avoid the regulation - ﬁrms are genuinely changing
their activities in a theoretically expected direction.
6.4 Insurance Beneﬁts of EPL
Lazear (1990) argues that ﬁrms can respond to employment protection regulation in a “Coasian” manner
by contracting around the regulation. Since workers enjoy greater insurance from negative shocks through
the increased ﬁring costs they should be prepared to accept lower wages as a compensating diﬀerential.
With suﬃciently ﬂexible and enforceable contracts, the cost to the ﬁrm of being above 50 may not matter.
Contracts may be very incomplete of course, causing downward nominal wage rigidity especially in France
where there are strong unions and high minimum wages. Low trust between employers and employees and
credit constraints for workers could also limit such contractual ﬂexibility.
We examine this empirically by looking at wages around the threshold (see Figure 17). If there are such
insurance beneﬁts we would expect wages to be lower after the threshold of 50 employees. As expected
the wage is upward sloping, but there does not appear to be a signiﬁcant fall in wages after the regulatory
threshold. Therefore we do not think that ﬁrms are able to completely “contract around” the regulation in
15These outsourced workers will enter as an intermediate input and are therefore not included in total employment.
19this manner to oﬀset the costs of the implicit labor tax.
6.5 Industry Heterogeneity
For simplicity we have taken a macro-economic approach in this paper, yet clearly the eﬀects of the regulation
are likely to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent industries. For example, in industries where technology dictates a
minimum eﬃcient scale of well over 50 employees, there will be no small ﬁrms around the threshold. It is
straightforward to extend the methodology to allow sector-speciﬁc values of the parameters. In principle
we simply estimate industry-speciﬁc versions of the structural parameters from size distribution and the
production functions.
As a preliminary step in this direction we estimated the parameters splitting the data into high and low
tech sectors as discussed above. Future versions will try and allow for much more industry heterogeneity.
6.6 Growth Analysis near the threshold
In a dynamic sense, the knowledge that going over 50 employees will generate a large increase in costs should
aﬀect the growth behavior of ﬁrms near the threshold. Since ﬁrms are hit by idiosyncratic shocks (e.g.
less quits than usual), they may inadvertently get caught in the high regulation regime. Thus there is a
strong disincentive to grow for ﬁrms which are approaching the threshold size. We can examine this issue by
looking at growth dynamics at diﬀerent size thresholds. Indeed we ﬁnd that the growth process appears to
be distorted near the threshold with ﬁrms just below the threshold signiﬁcantly less likely to grow and ﬁrms
just above the threshold signiﬁcantly more likely to shrink.
More subtly, the diﬃculty of growing beyond a threshold may aﬀect ﬁrms dynamic decisions. For example,
if ﬁrms learn about their TFP through growing then the tax on size will reduce the learning process and
cause a dynamic further. Also, if ﬁrms are concerned for stochastic reasons they may cross the threshold they
may cut their size back even further below 49 in order to be well away from the threshold.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
How costly is labor market regulation? This is a long-debated subject in policy circles and economics. We have
tried to shed light on this issue by introducing a structural methodology that combines a simple theoretical
general equilibrium approach based on the well known Lucas (1978) model of the size and productivity
distribution of ﬁrms. We introduce size-speciﬁc regulations into this model, exploiting the fact that in most
countries EPL only bites when ﬁrms cross speciﬁc size thresholds. We show how such a model generates
predictions about the changes in the size and productivity distribution and moreover, can be used to generate
20an estimate of the implicit tax of the regulation. Intuitively, ﬁrms will optimally choose to remain small to
avoid the regulation, so the size distribution becomes distorted with “too many” ﬁrms just below the size
threshold and “too few” ﬁrms just above it. Furthermore, the distribution of productivity is also distorted:
some of those ﬁrms just below the cut-oﬀ are “too productive” as they have been prevented from growing
to their optimal size by the regulation. We show how the regulation creates welfare losses by (i) allocating
too little employment to more productive ﬁrms who choose to be just below the regulatory threshold, (ii)
allocating too little employment to more productive ﬁrms because they bear the implicit labor tax (whereas
small ﬁrms do not) and (iii) through reducing equilibrium wages (due to some tax incidence falling on workers)
this encourages too many individuals to become small entrepreneurs rather than working as employees for
more productive entrepreneurs.
We implement this model on the universe of ﬁrms in the French private economy. France has onerous
labor laws which bite when a ﬁrm has 50 employees, so is ideally suited to our framework. We ﬁnd that
the qualitative predictions of the model ﬁt very well: (i) there is a sharp fall oﬀ in the ﬁrm size distribution
precisely at 50 employees resembling a “broken power law” and (ii) there is a bulge in productivity just to
the left of the size threshold. Having good employment measures over the population of ﬁrms helps a lot.
We then estimate the key parameters of the theoretical model from the ﬁrm size distribution. Our approach
delivers quite a stable and robust cost of the employment regulation which seems to place an additional cost
on labor in the range of 5-10% of the wage.
This is just the preliminary sketch of our research program. We need to do a lot more testing of the results
and extensions to the greater institutional complexity of the labor market. We believe that our approach is
a simple, powerful and potentially fruitful way to tackle the vexed problem of the impact of regulation on
modern economies.
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24AO m i t t e d P r o o f s
A.1 Adding up constraint on 
How do we derived equation (14) from equation (13)? The ﬁrm size distribution is given by the broken power
law in equation (13):
∗()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(1 − )
−1
1 − if 49 = 1()
R 
 ()d =  if  =4 9=1()
0 if 49   = 2()
(1 − )
−1
2 − if 2()= ≤ 
There are actually two additional restrictions on this:





1 −d) must be equal to the employment displaced from the “missing
middle” of the distribution in the counterfactual world without taxes (
R 2()
2() (1 − )
−1
2 −d).




























































2. This is a pdf, so this adds up to 1 (with support on [1;+∞]):












































Which allows us to re-write the pdf of ∗:
25∗()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
( − 1)− if 49 = 1()
491− − 1−
 if  =4 9=1()
0 if 49   = 2()
( − 1)− if 2()= ≤ 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
As we show in the case where employment is measured with error the conditional CDF is given by:
P( |)=

         
         
0 if −  1
( − 1)
 −









 if 49 ≤ −  
1 − 
1−
 +(  − 1)
 −
 −d if  ≤ −
=

   
   
0 if ln() 
1 −

−1− if ln() − ln(49) ≤ ln()
1 − 
1−
 if ln() − ln() ≤ ln() − ln(49)
1 − 

−1− if  ≤ ln() − ln()










































































































































In fact there is no additional constraint in the parameters, because we can show that this function is strictly








0 × (1 − 1) = 0 () −→
→0
 × (0 − 0) = 0
() −→
→+∞





0 × 1=0 () −→
→0
+∞ × (0 − 0) = 0 (*)


































































































































− ( − 1)

(19)
We use standard ML techniques to estimate the parameters in equation (19).
27B Least squares estimation of broken Power Law
We discuss here an alternative to our MLE approach. Taking as our starting point the power law for ﬁrm
sizes, we can proceed as follows:




where  is a dummy variable that turns on to 1 for ﬁrms above the threshold  and is zero otherwise)
but we have added  dummies that pick up the average number of ﬁrms in the distorted size categories, i.e.





Following Axtell (2001), we can estimate equation (20) through OLS16, conditional on the ‘structural
breaks’ at  and To ﬁnd these structural break points, we follow Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998)
in their study of structural breaks in time series models. In our context, their result implies that for each
partition {{1}{}{} one obtains the OLS estimators of {12} subject to constraint
 X
=
 =0 .17 Letting the sum of squared errors generated by each of these partitions be ( ) our
estimates of the ‘break points’,  and  are:
(b b )=a r gm i n

( ) (21)
Bai and Perron (1998) show that, for a wide range of error speciﬁcations (including heteroskedastic like in
our case) the break points are consistently estimated, and converge at rate ´ where ´  is the maximum ﬁrm
size as long as  −  ´  and    (the break points are asymptotically distinct) which is true in
our framework since we know   
Armed with these parameter estimates we can the proceed to estimate  using the results above. One
intuitive way of seeing the procedure is as follows. Fix the lower employment threshold (say 43) and estimate
the power law (conservatively) only on the part of the employment distribution below this and on the upper
part of the size distribution that is undistorted (say under 43 and over 100).18 This procedure generates a
16See Gabaix and Ibragimo (2008) for improvements in the OLS procedure using ranks, which is preferred for small samples
and for the upper part of the distribution (not the middle, our focus).
17Perron and Qu (2006) show that the framework can accomodate linear restrictions on the parameter; and that the consistency
and rate of convergence results hold and the limiting distribution is unaﬀected. However, our constraint is non-linear and no
results exist on whether the results hold.
18We could in principle use all ﬁr m sa ss m a l la so n ee m p l o y e ea n du pt h el a r g e s tﬁrm in the economy. In practice the Power
Law tends to be violated at these extremes of the distribution in all countries (e.g. Axtell (2001), so we follow that standard
approach of trimming the upper and lower tails. We show that nothing is sensitive to these exact maximum and minimum
employment thresholds as can be seen from the various ﬁgures.
28mass of ﬁrms (entrepreneurs) displaced to the “bulge” in the distribution between  and  (i.e. 43 and 50)
a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e9 .T h e s eﬁrms are drawn from between  and  and since we know the counterfactual
slope of the power paw over this region, we can reallocate these ﬁrms so as to minimize the deviation from
this counterfactual power law.  i se s t i m a t e da st h em a x i m u me m p l o y m e n tb i nw h i c hi sa t t a i n e di nt h i s
procedure.
Rather than ﬁxing , the Bai and Perron (1998) procedure estimates this eﬃciently by minimizing a sum
of squares criterion along with the other parameters in the model as in equation (21).
This procedure gives us all the parameters necessary to estimate the implicit cost of the regulation which
we calculate is equivalent to a labor tax of around 26% ( =1 26)
29C Using information from the productivity distribution
C.1 Incorporating TFP into the estimation method
We can do much better if we have direct information on the TFP Distribution. Estimation is a challenge
here (see next sub-section), but let us initially assume we have reliable on TFP. First, recall from equation













if  ≤ 
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ln =l n1{} +l n2{≤} +l n3{≤} (22)
where  is an indicator function for a particular regime. If we have a measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc ,T F P ,t h e n
we can estimate equation (22). This is one way to obtain an estimate of  that is needed to calculate the
implicit tax of regulation. Alternatively, we can estimate  directly as the returns to scale parameter directly
from a production function. We show the results from both methods in Table 2.
C.2 Estimation of TFP
There is no one settled way of best estimating TFP on ﬁrm level data and there are many approaches
suggested in the literature. Fortunately, at least at the micro-level, diﬀerent methods tend to produce results
where the correlation of TFP estimated by diﬀerent methods is usually high (see Syverson, 2010).
30In the baseline result we follow the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) who propose extending the
Olley and Pakes (1996) control function method to allow for endogeneity and selection. Olley and Pakes
proposed inverting the investment rule to control for the unobserved productivity shock (observed to ﬁrm but
unobserved to econometrician) that aﬀects the ﬁrm’s decision over hiring (and whether to stay in business).
Because of the problem of zero investment regimes (common especially among smaller ﬁrms that we use in
our dataset) Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) recommended using materials as an alternative proxy variable that
(almost) always takes an observed positive value.
We use this estimator to estimate ﬁrm-level production functions on French panel data 2002-2007 (using
the unbalanced panel) by each of the four-digit manufacturing industries in our dataset. We also did the
same for the retail sector and the business services sector. The production functions take the form (in each
industry):
ln =  ln +  ln +  ln +  +  +  (23)
where  =o u t p u t , = labour, = capital,  =m a t e r i a l s , is the unobserved productivity shock,  is
a set of time dummies and  is the idiosyncratic error of ﬁrm  in year  From estimating the parameters
of the production function we can then recover our estimate of the persistent component of TFP. Note that
TFP is always normalized within industry and year.
There are of course many problems with these estimation techniques. For example, Ackerberg et al (2006)
focus on the problem of exact multicollinearity of the variable factors conditional on the quasi-ﬁxed factors
given the assumption that input prices are assumed to be common across ﬁrms. Ackerberg et al (2007)
suggest various solutions to this issue.
We consider alternative ways to estimate TFP including the more standard Solow approach. Here we
assume that we can estimate the factor coeﬃcients in equation (23) by using the observed factor shares in
revenues. We do this assuming constant returns to scale, so  = 
 ; = 
 and  =1− 
 − 
 where
c = the price of materials. We used the four digit industry factor shares averaged over our sample period
for the baseline but also experimented with some ﬁrm-speciﬁc (time invariant) factor shares. As usual these
alternative measures led to similar results.
A problem with both of these methods is that we do not observe ﬁrm-speciﬁc prices so the estimates of
TFP as we only control for four digit industry prices. Consequently, the results we obtain could be regarded
as only revenue-based TFPR instead of quantity-based TFPQ (see Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). TFPQ is closer
to what we want to theoretically obtain as our estimate of In practice, there is a high correlation between
these two measures as shown by Foster et al (2008) who have actual data on plant level input and output
31prices. So it is unclear whether this would make too much of a practical diﬀerence to our results.
An alternative approach would be to follow de Loecker (2010) and put more structure on the product
market. For example, assuming that the product market is monopolistically competitive enables the econo-
metrician in principle to estimate the elasticity of demand and correct for the mark-up implicit in TFPR to
obtain TFPQ. We will pursue this in future work.
32D More Details of some Size-Relation Labor Market Regulations
in France
The main bite of labor (and some accounting) regulations comes when the ﬁrm reaches 50 employees. But
there are also some other size-related thresholds at other levels. The main other ones comes at 10-11 employees.
For this reason we generally trim the analysis below 12 employees to mitigate nay bias induced in estimation
from these other thresholds. For more details on French regulation see inter alia Abowd and Kramarz (2003)
and Kramarz and Michaud (2010).
D.1 Labor Regulations
From ﬁfty employees:
• Obligation to use a complex redundancy plan with oversight, approval and monitoring from Ministry of
Labor in case of a collective redundancy for 9 or more employees (threshold based on total employment
at time of redundancy). See text.
• Appointing a shop steward if demanded by workers (threshold exceeded for 12 consecutive months
during the last three years);
• Obligation to establish a committee on health, safety and working conditions (HSC) and train its
members (threshold exceeded for 12 months during the last three years)
• Obligation to establish a proﬁt sharing (threshold exceeded for six months during the accounting year
within one year after the year end to reach an agreement);
• Obligation to establish a staﬀ committee with business meeting at least every two months (plant level:
threshold exceeded for 12 months during the last three years )
From twenty-ﬁve employees:
• Duty to supply a refectory if requested by all employees;
• Electoral colleges for electing representatives. Increased number of delegates from 26 employees.
From twenty employees:
• Contribution to the National Fund for Housing Assistance;
• Increase the contribution rate for continuing vocational training of 1.05% to 1.60%
33• Compensatory rest of 50% for mandatory overtime beyond 41 hours per week
From eleven employees:
• Allowance of at least six months salary if terminated without cause or serious;
• Obligation to conduct the election of staﬀ representatives(threshold exceeded for 12 consecutive months
over the last three years).
• From ten employees:
• Monthly payment of social security contributions, instead of a quarterly payment (according to the
actual last day of previous quarter);
• Obligation for payment of transport subsidies (Article L. 2333-64 of the General Code local authorities);
• Increase the contribution rate for continuing vocational training of 0.55% to 1.05% (threshold exceeded
on average 12 months).
D.2 Accounting rules
The additional requirements depending on the number of employees of enterprises, but also limits on turnover
and total assets are as follows:
From ﬁfty employees:
• loss of the possibility of a simpliﬁed presentation of Schedule 2 to the accounts (also if the balance sheet
total exceeds 2 million or if the CA exceeds 4 million);
• requirement for LLCs, the CNS, limited partnerships and legal persons of private law to designate an
auditor (also if the balance sheet total exceeds 1.55 million euros or if the CA is more than 3.1 million
euros, applicable rules of the current year).
From ten employees:
• loss of the possibility of a simpliﬁed balance sheet and income statement (also if the CA exceeds 534
000 euro or if the balance sheet total exceeds 267 000 euro, applicable rule in case of exceeding the
threshold for two consecutive years).
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Table 1: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Broken Power Law (with measurement error) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Parameter  Baseline  High Tech Sectors  Low Tech Sectors 

































       
Mean(Median) # of  employees  30.487(6)  67.731(8)  24.747(6) 
Observations  690,855  92,260  598,595 
Firms  167,528  21,503  146,466 
 
Notes:    Parameters  estimated  by  ML  with  standard  errors  below  in  parentheses  (clustered  by  firm).  Estimation  on 
unbalanced panel 2002-2007 of population of French manufacturing firms with 2 or more employees. “High tech” sectors 
are based on R&D intensity as defined by the OECD. 
 Table 2: Estimate of the Implicit Tax from Regulation, τ 
 
Experiment  Scale parameter  Implicit Tax 
       
1. Calibrated   0.800  1.066 
(0.003) 




















     
 
Notes:  These are estimates of the implicit tax based on the results in Table 1 and different estimates of   based on the methods indicated in the 
different rows. Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. “Using TFP-Size relationship” calculates 
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ln / ln n     is  calculated  from  the  coefficient  of  a  regression  of  employment  on  TFP  (see  Figure  10).  “Using  the  production  function” 
calculates   as the sum of the coefficients on the factor inputs (see Table A1). “Split sample production function” estimates the production 
function separately for small firms (below 45 employees) and large firms (above 65 employees). We use a value of    which is the arithmetic 
average of the two estimates to calculate τ. “High tech” sectors are based on R&D intensity as defined by the OECD. The parameters of the size 
distribution are taken from Table 1 and separate production functions are estimated for each sector. Figure 1: The Firm size distribution in the US and France 
 
Source: FICUS for France and Census for the US. Population databases of all firms. 
Notes: This is the distribution of firms (not plants). Authors' calculations Figure 2: Number of Firms by employment size in France 
 
Source: FICUS 
Notes: This is the population of manufacturing firms in  France with between 31 and 69 employees. This plots the number of firms in each exact size category 
(i.e. raw data, no binning). There is a clear drop when the employment regulation begins for firms with 50 or more employees. Figure 3: Definitions of regimes in terms of managerial ability 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the definitions of different regimes in our model.  Individuals with managerial ability below α_min choose to be workers rather than 
managers. Individuals with ability between α_min  and α_c are “small firms” who (conditional on the equilibrium wage, which is lower under regulation) do 
not change their optimal size. Between α_c and α_u are individuals who are affected by the regulatory constraint and choose their firm size to be smaller than 
they otherwise would have been - we call these individuals/firms who are in a “distorted” regime. Individuals with ability above α_u are choosing to pay the 
tax rather than keep themselves small.   




Notes: This figure shows the theoretical firm size distribution with exponentially increasing bins. The tallest bar represents the point at which the size 
constraint bins. Parameters: Beta_alpha = 1.6, tau = 1.01, n_u = 60, theta = 0.9, Beta=1.06.  
 
Figure 5: Theoretical Relationship between TFP (managerial talent) and firm size  
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the theoretical relationship between TFP and firm size. There is a mass of firms at employment size=50 where the regulatory 
constraint binds. Parameters: Beta_alpha = 1.6, tau = 1.01, n_u = 60, theta = 0.9, Beta=1.06. 
  
Figure 6: The Theoretical Firm Size Distribution when employment is measured with error 
 
 
Note: The solid (blue) line shows the theoretical firm size distribution (broken power law), n*. The dashed line shows the new firm size distribution when we 
extend the model, to allow employment size to be measured with error with σ = 0.15. The solid dark line increases the measurement error to σ = 0.5  
Figure 7: The effect on the measured firm size distribution using 
Alternative Datasets and definitions of employment 
 
  
Figure 8:  Share of Firms by employment size 
 Figure 9: TFP Distribution by Firm Size  
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the (kernel density smoothed) distribution of TFP (estimated by the Levinsohn Petrin method) across four size classes. TFP is relative 
to the four digit industry by year average.  
Figure 10: TFP Distribution around the regulatory threshold of 50 
employees 
Panel A: Short Employment span 
 
Panel B: Longer Employment span 
 
 
Notes: This figures plots the mean level of TFP by firm employment size using an upper support of 
100 (Panel A) or 500 (Panel B). A fourth order polynomial is displayed in both panels using only data 
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Notes: This shows the difference between the fit of the model (dashed red line) which allows for 
measurement error with the actual data. We also include the “pure” theoretical predictions (in blue).  
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Under control Aggregated at the group level    Figure 13: Adjustment in the hours margin around the threshold (annual 
hours per worker) 
 
Notes: Annual average hours per worker -  combined FICUS and DADs data.Figure 14: Capital per worker around the threshold 
 
 Figure 15: Adjustment in Types of Labor 
A. Share of Managers 
 
B. Share of manual workers 
 
C. Share of Clerical Workers 
 
Notes: This looks at the share of the main three occupational groups using combined FICUS and 
DADs data. 
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Notes: Share of spending on outsourced workers in total expenditure -  combined FICUS and DADs 
data. This is counted as an intermediate input in the FICUS so is not included in value added or 
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Table A1: Production Function Estimation  
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Baseline  High Tech Sectors  Low Tech Sectors 












       
Observations  690,855  92,260  598,595 
Firms  167,528  21,503  146,466 
 
Notes:  Parameters estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin method. Estimation on unbalanced panel 
2002-2007 of population of French manufacturing firms with 2 or more employees. “High 
tech” sectors are based on R&D intensity as defined by the OECD. 
 